Emergence of India as a prospective global leader is widely acknowledged. As a global leader it is not just sufficient to have a good knowledge economy supported by a robust manufacturing centre, but it is essential to have a responsible and sensitive administration on the lead.
On 24th April 2008 speaking at the 9th D P Kohli Memorial Lecture the Vice President of India – Shri Hamid Anzari said: “We have a situation in which the politics of corruption and the corruption of politics fuel each other. Both impact adversely on governance and therefore on development. A UNDP report estimated that if corruption levels are reduced to those of Scandinavian countries, investment would increase by 10 per cent and the GDP growth by 1.5 per cent.” As per the latest report of the Transparency International 25% of the respondents had to pay a bribe to get things done. Worse, 90% of those interviewed felt that corruption will only increase in future. These remarks reflect upon the lack of integrity, credibility and commitment of government officials.
However it is not just corruption which plagues the steel frame of the country. Many studies have come out with robust evidence on the
effort deficit (gap between what public servants know and what they actually do) by government officials in stark contrast to their capabilities. It shows the lack of inclination or motivation or incentive to utilise their capabilities for nation building. The Hota Committee[1] on civil service reforms (July 2004) held that bright and upright civil servants are not only dwindling in numbers but are also getting marginalised in the process of decision making and implementation of government programmes. The seminar organised by CAG in 2004[2] noted that absence of a system of reward and punishment in Indian executives may have partly contributed to the overall insensitivity to outcome of development schemes undertaken.
It is indisputable that for over the past one decade a significant number of mediocre candidates looking for job security, or meritorious candidates looking for power and high social status, save any intention of helping the nation are getting selected to the service. This is despite the claims of 6th Central Pay Commission (CPC) that the bright and service oriented are still attracted to civil services. In fact many enter the gates of UPSC with the best efforts, only to exhibit effort deficit later. The training institutes for probationary officers now echo the practical wisdom of pretending to be ignorant, less efficient and less enthusiastic so as to be successful in personal lives.
There are many reasons at work behind the effort deficit like, lack of fixity of tenure and absence of objective and impartial evaluation of work on the basis of annual performance targets etc. The need for performance evaluation has been talked by many commissions and agencies but was successfully pushed under the carpet by pointing out the element of subjectivity involved in any kind of evaluation. This is so when in a county like New Zealand the salaries of the secretaries are linked to their performances. The 6th CPC suggested pay band system and Performance Related Incentive Scheme (PRIS)[3] for all the civil servants in addition to an annual increment of 3.5% of the annual salary as bonus for 20% of best performing PB-3 grade officers. Even in US, when such a scheme was introduced the civil service fraternity rose to the occasion and made everybody best performers. In India due to the stipulation of “percentage of population” the civil service fraternity might rotate the chances for every one. For performing officers, more than the extra pay what they aspire for is recognition for their work and due consideration in promotion to bigger tasks rather than pushing the undeserving to key posts. The simple task of assuring transparency in promotion can correct this.
It is not to say that PRIS is totally irrelevant. Those countries (except a few like Australia) which adopted performance based pay system has not abandoned it but only corrected it for the loopholes. In India a beginning has to be made somewhere. When pension reforms were thought out by the Government, they did not touch upon the existing government staff. Rather they implemented a New Pension Scheme for the fresh recruits. Similarly such a ‘divide and rule policy’ can also be tried out here. The new recruits who are now receiving a pay package similar to those in private enterprises (the basic for the fresh recruit is Rs. 21,000) can be subjected to the performance evaluation scheme from the very beginning and can be considered for the bonus.
Bringing all the civil servants to performance based evaluation is too ambitious. Any front line attack on bureaucracy will be surely opposed. The backdoor policy of making departments accountable for the money they receive from the government is a much more viable option. That is the way many countries like Australia or US have done it. The possibility of a budget cut and abolition of the section /division can perhaps wake up the sleeping giants from the crater of effort deficit. The RTI or FRBM did exactly this backdoor management of civil servants. They did not attack the civil servants straight way, but simply empowered the opposite party.
In addition, some changes also have to be made in the selection mode of UPSC. When we look at IES, the greatest challenge now, seems to get officers with policy and application interest in Economics. For IES to establish its identity as a group of professionals, it is imperative to significantly increase the intake of candidates for whom IES is the first choice. It can be corrected only through a proper selection mechanism. For instance we need to catch them young and train accordingly. Following is a tentative plan we can work out on.
Conduct the All India Exam when prospective candidates are doing their MA 1st year. By the time they finish their MA the result of the exams should be out, selecting a total of around 3 times or even 5 times the number of vacancies. (Exam can be conducted twice in a year or can be taken twice- during their first year of MA or second year of MA. In a way, chances are limited to two attempts)
Create IES quotas / Chairs in reputed Central Universities or Institutes for M.Phil (some institutes have a two year programme whereas some have only a one year programme. Hence some thought has to be given in selecting the institutes)
The selected candidates can opt for the M.Phil programme at these institutes which would sharpen their research and academic interest in the subject. For those who don’t come under any merit cum means scholarship, some stipend or scholarship can also be thought of.
After the completion of M.Phil final interviews can be held. In fact there is nothing to loose for the candidates who do not get selected.
The selected officer trainees can be sent for a one year attachment with the district collector or can be appointed as Research Officers to the District Rural Development Authority of their own home district. At this stage they need to prepare a development plan for the district and the same can be used as an evaluation mode by the cadre along with the ACR from the District Collector.
After the completion of their district attachment they should be sent to another one year of training, exposing them to the various sectoral issues as done right now. This would complete the two years of probation with the least cost on exchequer.
In this process we correct for the lack of field experience among the policy makers. Also it assures the entry of people with right attitude, right academic interest and skill set. If we fail to act now, perhaps we would fail to produce economists with global outlook and mindset as Dr. Seema Gaur pointed out on IES today (30 April 2008).
(Author is a civil servant and the views expressed here are her personal views and do not reflect the views of the government. This is an article written in the daily online newsletter of IES officers – IES today on May 5th, 2008.)
On 24th April 2008 speaking at the 9th D P Kohli Memorial Lecture the Vice President of India – Shri Hamid Anzari said: “We have a situation in which the politics of corruption and the corruption of politics fuel each other. Both impact adversely on governance and therefore on development. A UNDP report estimated that if corruption levels are reduced to those of Scandinavian countries, investment would increase by 10 per cent and the GDP growth by 1.5 per cent.” As per the latest report of the Transparency International 25% of the respondents had to pay a bribe to get things done. Worse, 90% of those interviewed felt that corruption will only increase in future. These remarks reflect upon the lack of integrity, credibility and commitment of government officials.
However it is not just corruption which plagues the steel frame of the country. Many studies have come out with robust evidence on the
effort deficit (gap between what public servants know and what they actually do) by government officials in stark contrast to their capabilities. It shows the lack of inclination or motivation or incentive to utilise their capabilities for nation building. The Hota Committee[1] on civil service reforms (July 2004) held that bright and upright civil servants are not only dwindling in numbers but are also getting marginalised in the process of decision making and implementation of government programmes. The seminar organised by CAG in 2004[2] noted that absence of a system of reward and punishment in Indian executives may have partly contributed to the overall insensitivity to outcome of development schemes undertaken.It is indisputable that for over the past one decade a significant number of mediocre candidates looking for job security, or meritorious candidates looking for power and high social status, save any intention of helping the nation are getting selected to the service. This is despite the claims of 6th Central Pay Commission (CPC) that the bright and service oriented are still attracted to civil services. In fact many enter the gates of UPSC with the best efforts, only to exhibit effort deficit later. The training institutes for probationary officers now echo the practical wisdom of pretending to be ignorant, less efficient and less enthusiastic so as to be successful in personal lives.
There are many reasons at work behind the effort deficit like, lack of fixity of tenure and absence of objective and impartial evaluation of work on the basis of annual performance targets etc. The need for performance evaluation has been talked by many commissions and agencies but was successfully pushed under the carpet by pointing out the element of subjectivity involved in any kind of evaluation. This is so when in a county like New Zealand the salaries of the secretaries are linked to their performances. The 6th CPC suggested pay band system and Performance Related Incentive Scheme (PRIS)[3] for all the civil servants in addition to an annual increment of 3.5% of the annual salary as bonus for 20% of best performing PB-3 grade officers. Even in US, when such a scheme was introduced the civil service fraternity rose to the occasion and made everybody best performers. In India due to the stipulation of “percentage of population” the civil service fraternity might rotate the chances for every one. For performing officers, more than the extra pay what they aspire for is recognition for their work and due consideration in promotion to bigger tasks rather than pushing the undeserving to key posts. The simple task of assuring transparency in promotion can correct this.
It is not to say that PRIS is totally irrelevant. Those countries (except a few like Australia) which adopted performance based pay system has not abandoned it but only corrected it for the loopholes. In India a beginning has to be made somewhere. When pension reforms were thought out by the Government, they did not touch upon the existing government staff. Rather they implemented a New Pension Scheme for the fresh recruits. Similarly such a ‘divide and rule policy’ can also be tried out here. The new recruits who are now receiving a pay package similar to those in private enterprises (the basic for the fresh recruit is Rs. 21,000) can be subjected to the performance evaluation scheme from the very beginning and can be considered for the bonus.
Bringing all the civil servants to performance based evaluation is too ambitious. Any front line attack on bureaucracy will be surely opposed. The backdoor policy of making departments accountable for the money they receive from the government is a much more viable option. That is the way many countries like Australia or US have done it. The possibility of a budget cut and abolition of the section /division can perhaps wake up the sleeping giants from the crater of effort deficit. The RTI or FRBM did exactly this backdoor management of civil servants. They did not attack the civil servants straight way, but simply empowered the opposite party.
In addition, some changes also have to be made in the selection mode of UPSC. When we look at IES, the greatest challenge now, seems to get officers with policy and application interest in Economics. For IES to establish its identity as a group of professionals, it is imperative to significantly increase the intake of candidates for whom IES is the first choice. It can be corrected only through a proper selection mechanism. For instance we need to catch them young and train accordingly. Following is a tentative plan we can work out on.
Conduct the All India Exam when prospective candidates are doing their MA 1st year. By the time they finish their MA the result of the exams should be out, selecting a total of around 3 times or even 5 times the number of vacancies. (Exam can be conducted twice in a year or can be taken twice- during their first year of MA or second year of MA. In a way, chances are limited to two attempts)
Create IES quotas / Chairs in reputed Central Universities or Institutes for M.Phil (some institutes have a two year programme whereas some have only a one year programme. Hence some thought has to be given in selecting the institutes)
The selected candidates can opt for the M.Phil programme at these institutes which would sharpen their research and academic interest in the subject. For those who don’t come under any merit cum means scholarship, some stipend or scholarship can also be thought of.
After the completion of M.Phil final interviews can be held. In fact there is nothing to loose for the candidates who do not get selected.
The selected officer trainees can be sent for a one year attachment with the district collector or can be appointed as Research Officers to the District Rural Development Authority of their own home district. At this stage they need to prepare a development plan for the district and the same can be used as an evaluation mode by the cadre along with the ACR from the District Collector.
After the completion of their district attachment they should be sent to another one year of training, exposing them to the various sectoral issues as done right now. This would complete the two years of probation with the least cost on exchequer.
In this process we correct for the lack of field experience among the policy makers. Also it assures the entry of people with right attitude, right academic interest and skill set. If we fail to act now, perhaps we would fail to produce economists with global outlook and mindset as Dr. Seema Gaur pointed out on IES today (30 April 2008).
(Author is a civil servant and the views expressed here are her personal views and do not reflect the views of the government. This is an article written in the daily online newsletter of IES officers – IES today on May 5th, 2008.)
Read, every day, something no one else is reading. Think, every day, something no one else is thinking. Do, every day, something no one else would be silly enough to do. It is bad for the mind to be always part of unanimity. - Christopher Morley
[1] Administrative Reforms in the era of Liberalisation and Globaliseaton: Need for change of mindset of civil servants, P.C. Hota, Indian Journal of Public Administration Vol LIII, No.3, July-September 2007
[2] Proceedings of the Seminar on “Performance Indicators - Economic & social sectors”- held at National Academy of Audit & Accounts, Shimla on 17 /01 /2004, pp-32
[3] Chapter 2.5 of 6th CPC report
[1] Administrative Reforms in the era of Liberalisation and Globaliseaton: Need for change of mindset of civil servants, P.C. Hota, Indian Journal of Public Administration Vol LIII, No.3, July-September 2007
[2] Proceedings of the Seminar on “Performance Indicators - Economic & social sectors”- held at National Academy of Audit & Accounts, Shimla on 17 /01 /2004, pp-32
[3] Chapter 2.5 of 6th CPC report
1 comment:
Hi Rose.Informative and pleasent language
Post a Comment